On What Matters: Volume One

Derek Parfit

May 2011 · OUP Oxford

About this ebook

On What Matters is a major work in moral philosophy. It is the long-awaited follow-up to Derek Parfit's 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. In this first volume Parfit presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and rationality, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories — Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism — leading to his own ground-breaking synthetic conclusion. Along the way he discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility. On What Matters is already the most-discussed work in moral philosophy: its publication is likely to establish it as a modern classic which everyone working on moral philosophy will have to read, and which many others will turn to for stimulation and illumination.

Ratings and reviews

- Though some nonhuman animals may be ‘persons’ (often defined as rational and self-conscious sentient beings, regardless of species), Parfit's revised versions of the Golden Rule, such as G6 (his final version), may not appear to be applicable to nonhuman sentient beings who are not persons: - "G6: We ought to treat everyone as we would rationally be willing to be treated if we were going to be in all of these people’s positions, and would be relevantly like them." (pg 327) - - Immediately after (G6), he wrote: - "The word ‘everyone’ here refers to all of the people whom our acts might affect. In many cases, we are one of these people." - However, a few paragraphs later, he then says the following, which clearly implies that the Golden Rule (G6?) can be applied to nonhuman sentient beings who, presumably, are not persons: - "There are various objections to the Golden Rule. It can be difficult to imagine that we shall be in other people’s positions and shall be relevantly like these other people. And what we must try to imagine would often be deeply impossible. But that is not, as some writers claim, a decisive objection. Some thought-experiments are useful even though they ask us to imagine something that is deeply impossible. Einstein usefully asked what he would see if he were travelling at the speed of light. Though we could not possibly be the horse whom we are whipping, or the trapped and starved animal whose fur we are wearing, we can imagine such things well enough for moral purposes." (pg 329) - - Is Parfit being inconsistent here? Perhaps not. Perhaps Parfit's G6 is constrained by its context, in which he is comparing or relating the Golden Rule to Kantian contractualism. If the Golden Rule is applicable to all sentient beings, and not only persons (in the sense of rational and self-conscious sentient beings, regardless of species), wouldn't something like the following revision of G6 be required?: - G7: We ought to treat everyone as we would rationally be willing to be treated if we were going to be in all of these conscious or sentient beings' positions, and would be relevantly like them. - - So, why didn’t Parfit propose an interpretation of the Golden Rule along the lines of G7? It would be too easy to suggest that he was just being conservative by trying to avoid disagreement, because he was aiming to show, in the end, that various moral theories that apparently disagree actually agree with each other—though that does appear to be his conclusion, as you can see in chapter 17, “Conclusions”, which is the last chapter in Volume 1. - Some sentient beings may not qualify as either persons or rational beings, but why couldn't the Golden Rule be applied by a rational moral agent to all sentient or conscious beings, regardless of whether they are rational or self-conscious? According to Parfit, a rational moral agent is supposed to be able to determine what is in the rational best interests of a person with irrational desires, so why couldn’t a moral agent apply the Golden Rule, in the form of G7, to any sentient being who may have rational or irrational desires?: - “We can have rational beliefs and desires, and act rationally, without having any beliefs about reasons. Young children respond rationally to certain reasons or apparent reasons, though they do not yet have the concept of a reason. Dogs, cats, and some other animals respond to some kinds of reason---such as reasons to believe that we are about to feed them---though they will never have the concept of a reason. And some rational adults seem to lack this concept, or to forget that they have it.” (pg 118) - - Even though Parfit uses the word ‘person’ in his versions of the Golden Rule, elsewhere in the book it is clear that he is generally talking about all sentient beings, so he may be using the word ‘person’ as a convenient shorthand for all sentient or conscious beings.

About the author

Derek Parfit is one of the leading philosophers of our time. He is a Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, Global Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at New York University, and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of Reasons and Persons (OUP, 1984), one of the most influential books in philosophy of the last several decades.